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From Ratsiraka to Ravalomanana
Changing Narratives of Prickly Pears in Dryland Madagascar
Karen Middleton
  
  Fieldwork has been generously supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK)
(1981-1983), the Leverhulme Trust and Twenty-Seven Historical Foundation (1991), and the Nuffield
Foundation and the Rhodes Trust (2002-2003). In Madagascar I am endebted to the Ministère de la
Recherche scientifique et technologique pour le Développement, the University at Tuléar/Toliara,
government officials in Beloha, Marolinta, and Tsihombe, and ANGAP workers at Cap Sainte Marie
Special Reserve. Above all I should like to record my gratitude to the peoples of Karembola for their
kind assistance over many years.
 
Introduction
1 I  am walking the escarpment west  of  Anjedava in the Karembola region of  southern
Madagascar when my companion, a local man, points to a hamlet just south of our path.
The hamlet  is  surrounded by prickly pear and to my mind replicates the traditional
Karembola  homestead  as  described  extensively  in  colonial  literature.  I  am therefore
surprised  to  hear  my  companion  dismiss  it  as  “bad”.1 Its  inhabitants,  he  adds,  are
worthless good-for-nothings who have planted the raketa (prickly pear) with the sole
intention of selling it to wealthy stock-owners when drought comes and fodder is in short
supply. In this way, these “slaves” (ondevo) hoped to acquire goats, perhaps even cattle, of
their own.
2 Two aspects of this intervention retain my attention. First, the strong disapproval my
companion has expressed of the traditional local vernacular of the homestead. Secondly,
the evident disquiet he feels at the idea of “slaves” who dare to grow raketa in the hope of
bettering  themselves.  This  sets  me  thinking  more  broadly  about  the  indigenous
symbolism of raketa and how it has changed. The cultivation of prickly pears is often
portrayed as an essentially pragmatic response to the challenges of farming and herding
in  arid  conditions  yet  this  incident  suggests  that  in  Karembola  the  plant  might  be
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involved in far more complex issues of status and class conflict. Prickly pear here seems
to be implicated directly in a politics of rank, and this politics of rank would appear to be
decipherable only by looking at Karembola ideologies of [re]production and exchange.
3 In this article I propose to explore this question with reference to indigenous valuations
of four named varieties of prickly pear:
• Malagasy Cactus or raketa gasy, a variety introduced into Androy-Karembola-Mahafale via
Tôlañaro (Fort Dauphin) in the late eighteenth century (almost certainly 1769). It went on to
become a dominant, some say invasive, species in Karembola before being subjected in the
1920s to effective biological control.2
• Raketa vazaha or “foreign/white man’s cactus”/raketa from overseas, a spineless or nearly
spineless variety which, most authorities say, was introduced into the region by French
military officers in the early 1900s and whose extension became the subject of repeated,
largely unsuccessful, state-sponsored programmes.3
• Raketa saonjo (alternatively sonjo or soso), a variety which began to spread in Karembola in
the 1950s becoming by the early 1980s both the most common and the most popular prickly
pear species there. Colonial records are vague and dissonant about its origins; some local
oral evidence affirms that it was a hybrid born in situ of a cross between raketa gasy and 
raketa vazaha rather than an introduction.4
• Raketa mena or “red prickly pear”, a more recent arrival that has been expanding since at
least the 1970s, more or less beneath the radar of the state. By 2001 infestations had become
so obvious that the plant was denounced in a WWF-commissioned report as the primary
threat to biodiversity and livelihoods in the Cap Sainte Marie region (ANGAP et al, n.d.
[2001]).5
4 By  drawing  on  ethnography  collected  in  three  localities  of  Karembola  (Tranovaho,
Anjedava,  and Cap Sainte Marie (Tanjona Vohimena)) at intervals over a twenty-year
period (1981 to 2003), I will explore some of the cultural meanings which surround these
four species and show how these meanings have shifted over time. I shall relate these
narrative shifts to broader debates around social value and personhood, use-value and
commodification,  in  contexts  of  national  political  and  economic  developments.  In
particular, I want to explore the way raketa talk has shadowed and at times parodied
parallel  histories  in  the  island:  notably,  the  shift  from  state  socialist  to  neo-liberal
economics and the rise of biodiversity conservation over these two decades.6
 
Context of Study
5 Karembola is located in dryland Madagascar roughly between the Menarandra River and
Cap Sainte Marie (Tanjona Vohimena), between Androy and Mahafale.7 An average annual
rainfall of 200-350 mm is often quoted, though high interannual variation in precipitation
is more critical in defining the constraints and opportunities that Karembola farmers and
herders face. The effects are felt in hand hoe agriculture, where low soil moisture often
results  in  crop  failure,  and  in  livestock  production,  where  there  are  often  severe
restrictions on fodder and water supply. This is not to say that the limitations inherent in
a dryland ecology alone have made this one of the poorest and most marginalised regions
of Madagascar. Long-term histories of political disadvantage and social exclusion have
aggravated ecological constraints.
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6 It is in this socio-ecological context that prickly pears (Opuntia spp. )  can have useful
applications. Not only do prickly pears survive in drier habitats but selected varieties can
offer valuable resources to human societies faced with the uncertainties of farming or
herding in high-risk environments. The fruits and cladodes (leaf pads) of some species
can be harvested for human consumption, the succulent cladodes can be exploited to feed
and water livestock, and the spinier varieties make stout hedging for garden plots and
cattle pens (Barbera et al,  1995; Le Houérou, 1996). These uses partly account for the
multiple global transfers of prickly pears that took place from the New World after 1495.
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that introduced Opuntia have always been wholly
beneficial.  Some  have  become  invasive,  and  the  perceived  costs  to  agriculture  and
stockfarming  have  given  rise  to  campaigns  of  chemical  and  biological  control  in
Madagascar,  Australia,  India,  South  Africa,  and  elsewhere.  With  respect  to  southern
Madagascar, the additional argument has been increasingly made since the early 1990s
that alien Opuntia introductions present a serious threat to a unique biodiversity of global
value (Rauh, 1995: 55, 68; 1998: xi, 66).89
7 The communities reported in this paper all practice mixed stockraising and cropping.
Indeed,  in  contrast  to  externally  derived imagery of  Tandroy-Karembola-Mahafale  as
eternal pastoralists, I have always been struck by the high social value my informants
gave to agriculture and the way they linked it to rank and nobility of race. Certainly, zebu
cattle were highly valued as the quintessential sacrificial beast, the stipulated prestation
in ceremonial exchange, and the indicator of status, generally providing market income
only in drought years when they are sold to buy in food. But higher-ranking persons,
people who are truly masiñe (“efficacious”, “blessed”), were also said to show prowess as
food producers:
8 Prosperous, highborn people, hazomanga [ritually pure] people, produce crops, fill their
granaries, make fattened, greased bodies. People who don’t hoe behave like dependants,
deadbeats, skinny, weak.10
9 Cropping was mostly for subsistence, with limited market participation, though a few
farmers  devoted  some  land  to  cash  crops,  notably  groundnut,  and  many  more  sold
surpluses of field crops, often only to buy them back later in the year when their own
supplies  ran  short.  Household  livestock  holdings  varied  immensely,  ranging  from
substantial mixed holdings of cattle and small ruminants through to holdings of a few
goats or less. Beloha Prefecture was formerly a centre of mohair and wool production,
and average per capita goat and sheep numbers tend to be greater,  and cattle herds
proportionately smaller, than those reported for Androy (CENRADERU, 1980).
10 Cultivated foods were supplemented by a wide range of hunted, trapped and gathered
foods. In good years the consumption of such foods was mostly confined to children; as
food became scarcer or more costly increasing numbers of adults would resort to them,
depending on the resources available to the particular household. Local opportunities for
income  diversification  were  limited.  Some  cash  income  was  derived  from  trading
contraband  tobacco  on  local  circuits,  and  fish  and  gathered  plant  products  (ricin,
periwinkle) to regional markets for export;  but excessive supply resulting from large
scale entry of distressed people drives down prices at times when cash is scarce. Money is
brought in by wage labour emigration to the agricultural concessions, the mining centres,
and to the cities of Madagascar, where Karembola typically work as night watchmen and
pousse-pousse pullers.
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The re-ancestralization of Karembola c.1981-1983
11 I begin with popular narrative about raketa gasy, a plant that is insignificant, botanically
speaking, in Karembola today. I do so because in the early 1980s recollections of the time
this cactus died dominated communal narratives about the community and the state
(Middleton, 1997, 1999). The story basically went as follows: Malagasy Cactus was a native
plant, a divinely appointed ancestral staple. However, vazaha (“foreigner”, non-gasy; the
term here refers specifically to French colonisers) hated it because the thorny labyrinths
enabled subjects to resist wage labour and tax collectors by hiding and surviving on the
fruit.  To  “pacify”  the  region,  vazaha introduced  a  cochineal  insect,  a  predator  on
Malagasy Cactus, with devastating effect. The loss of this plant, the story goes, resulted in
regional depopulation as people and cattle either died in vast numbers or were scattered
into diverse corners of the colony, many never to return. In effect, the event became the
defining moment in Karembola history, scything time in two: first, there was “the time of
Malagasy Cactus” (tamy raketa gasy), which was also “the time of the ancestors” (tamy
razañe) or “gasy times” (tamy gasy), and then there was “foreign time” (tamy vazaha) after
Malagasy Cactus died.
12 I  dub  this  the  “nationalist”  version  of  Malagasy  Cactus  history  because  it  overlaps
significantly with versions that appeared in the Malagasy nationalist press soon after the
event. The most marked difference between the two versions is that while the nationalist
press  of  the early 1930s offered an essentially  secular  interpretation of  the death of
Malagasy Cactus as an event determined by colonial capitalism, my informants embedded
the same history in a language of the sacred and the divine. When Karembola mourned
the passing of Malagasy Cactus, they were not simply conducting an economic audit of
the costs to herding and farming in a water-scarce ecology, though these considerations
were  obviously  extremely  important.  Rather,  they  framed  their  discussion  of  the
economics in terms of a world of invisible power (asy) and moral blame (hakeo), linking
their loss to a land where all kinds of taboos were being broken with devastating results,
a land where proper, fully powered mpisoro (priests) and hazomanga (altar stakes) could no
longer be instated because their rightful owners were far away in Diego or Tuléar, leaving
only “children” in the ancestral land.
13 In the ritual domain, informants associated this “broken land” with the elaboration of
mortuary ritual and the aggrandizement of tombs. Multiplying tombs that expanded into
social space, blurring the distinction between the living and the dead, expressed their
sense of affliction as gasy living in a “foreign” land.  Such enactments of  despair and
passivity needed to be taken with a pinch of salt, however, because, in reality, Karembola
funerals in the early 1980s were vibrant arenas of action affording participants many
opportunities to enhance their prestige and “refresh” their wealth. In effect, the whole
economy  was  conceptualised  as  a  cycle  of  (re)production  in  which  decomposition/
slaughter  of  the  deceased’s  body/cattle  leads  to  the  regeneration  of  “living”  wealth
(“worms”)  through  exchanges  with  relatives,  affines  and  friends.  By  judicious
management of their social capital, by balancing expenditure on tomb construction and
mortuary feasts against incoming gifts, the bereaved could make a handsome profit and
enhance  their  prestige.  The  adverse  effects  of  labour  migration  that  dominated  the
narrative of Malagasy Cactus were similarly partly compensated by the resulting income
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that enabled Karembola to reconstitute drought-destituted herds and to participate in
ritual display/exchange at home.
14 A similar point about symbolic and economic resurgence can be made more narrowly
with respect to prickly pear. Since the 1920s successive administrations had put much
effort into promoting new Opuntia varieties, and some of these had become crucial to
local livelihoods. The spineless raketa vazaha had been promoted prior to the demise of
Malagasy Cactus. With post-war FIDES metropolitan funding (Fonds d’investissement pour le
développement  économique  et  social/Investment  Funds  for  Economic  and  Social
Development), vast plantations of this variety were created under late colonial regional
development schemes. Plantings continued under Philibert Tsiranana’s so-called “neo-
colonial” regime (1960-1972). According to most literature, these initiatives foundered
because  local  peoples  had  little  or  no  interest  in  making  them work:  the  collective
plantations  threatened  customary  pasturing  rights;  the  plantings  relied  on  “forced”
labour and took men from agricultural tasks at a time labour was scarce; and local people,
who already resented the French administration for destroying Malagasy Cactus, now
suspected it of alienating their land. Quite apart from the practical difficulties involved in
cultivating this spineless cactus - it is fussy over soil conditions, and requires protection
from inopportune grazing - there were inevitable cultural ambiguities associated with the
colonial promotion of “alien” forms of prickly pear.  In the early years of Tsiranana’s
Presidency, a group of Deputies from the Beloha/Androka region petitioned Parliament
for  the  restoration  of  the  “native”  cactus.  The  “Ministère  de  l’Agriculture  et  de
l’expansion rurale et du ravitaillement” rejected the petition but did agree to promote
raketa saonjo,  a new spiny variety that was already spreading in local communities by
informal means. It  was spiny enough to remind farmers-herders of the lost ancestral
cactus but not so spiny and invasive as to be considered a potential nuisance by the state.
15 By the early 1980s the use of raketa saonjo as a human food and as a fodder had acquired
the routinized look of customary behaviour. Men grilled the cladodes over open fires to
remove the spines in readiness for the cattle; women rolled the fruit underfoot to remove
the irritant “hairs” (glochids) which might otherwise become embedded in fingers, lips or
tongue – much as the pre-cochineal literature described (Decary, 1930: 128, 181). With
raketa hedging planted extensively along paths, around cattle pens and garden plots, the
landscapes of old Karembola had been partly recreated. Knowing how to manage and
exploit spiny cactus was once again an aspect of local knowledge and adaptation, part of
what it meant to be Karembola, distinguishing “children of locality” from vazaha.
16 To the extent  that  its  exploitation called for  local  knowledge and the application of
ancestral  techniques  that  had  once  applied  to  Malagasy  Cactus,  raketa  sonjo  had
undergone a degree of vernacularization. This was less true of raketambazaha (foreign or
colonial  cactus). Spineless,  fussy  over  soil  conditions,  more  obviously  different  from
Malagasy Cactus, it required new knowledge, acquired planting and handling techniques.
It did not slot readily into ancestral practice: it was too easily grazed to serve as hedging
or a stand alone fodder on the range. In addition, the fruit was impracticable as a human
staple/famine food because of the deadly constipation which results when the fruit is
consumed in large quantities. To eat it safely, you needed surplus, plenty of other foods in
the granary, or, ideally, the money to be able to purchase mangoes that are imported
from Mahafale  at  roughly  the  same time as  the  raketambazaha  season in  Karembola.
Nevertheless,  as  a  form of  conspicuous  consumption  associated  with  foreigners  and
surplus production, by the early 1980s raketambazaha eating had acquired positive status
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implications  in  the  local  context.  Its  favourable  evaluation  was  particularly  striking,
given that in former decades cattle had (allegedly) refused to eat the cladodes, people
refused to eat the fruit, and herders planted it only under duress.11
17 Interestingly, many informants stated that raketa sonjo had originated in raketambazaha, 
though they offered different versions of exactly how this occurred. Some subscribed to
the idea of reversion: spiny cladodes - raketa sonjo - had appeared on spineless cactus
plants. Others described a process of hybridization: spineless raketambazaha had crossed
with dying specimens of “Malagasy Cactus” to produce this new spiny form. It is tempting
to  read  these  narratives  as  metaphors  for  the  experience  of  cultural  métissage.  The
metaphor is most obvious in the version which holds raketa sonjo to be the product of a
union between a “native” and an “exotic” cactus pear. But the alternative version (where
raketambazaha “gave birth” to spiny sonjo without crossing with “Malagasy Cactus”) also
implies  a  kind  of  hybridity  since  this  foreign  or  European  cactus  “gave  birth”  in
Madagascar,  making  sonjo  a  “child  of  the  land”  (anatane).  Either  way,  the  positive
attitudes towards raketa sonjo and raketa vazaha were suggestive of a general acceptance of
hybrid cultural forms, the one associated with a “traditional” subsistence economy; the
other with surplus production incorporating elements of vazaha-ness.12
18 I have alluded to the “re-ancestralization” of Karembola in the early 1980s. Yet a degree
of symbolic tension between ancestral and non-ancestral types of raketa was necessary to
the integrity of  the master narrative of  Karembola history as  the death of  Malagasy
Cactus with its defining rupture between vazaha present and gasy past. Thus, informants
always  listed  raketa  (variety  unspecified)  as  an “ancestral  food”  (hanen-drazañe).  This
made sense because raketa was indeed a food, in many ways the food, the ancestors ate in
“Malagasy times”. But informants then qualified this by noting that in gasy times the
ancestors typically ate raketa gasy while “children” today ate “newly arrived” varieties (
raketa  vao  niavy).  In  short,  raketa  discourse  in  the  early  1980s  evinced  a  complex,
contextual symbolism whereby, rather than constituting simple binary contrasts, “new”
and “ancestral” cactus were both alike and unalike.13
19 Ambivalent (rather than negative) attitudes to “newcomer” raketa varieties reflected a
broader ambivalence in how people in the early 1980s remembered the colonial period.
Certainly,  informants dwelt on the cruelty of vazaha,  recalling how vazaha had killed,
enslaved, and humiliated gasy people, especially gasy men. Yet they regularly expressed
an admiration for perceived vazaha qualities:  wisdom, knowledge,  and cleanliness (by
1981  cloth  and  soap  had  become  scarce).  Typically  informants  described  vazaha  as
enlightened, knowing creatures who had “calmed the land” and enabled gasy to flourish
and mature (cf.  Cole and Middleton, 2001).  One particular theme that was to become
increasingly  pronounced  over  the  next  twenty  years  was  that  vazaha  “take  care  of
Tandroy when they suffer”. Vazaha had knocked away their very sustenance by killing
Malagasy Cactus, but since then they had been feeding them whenever harvests failed.
This contradictory view of colonial power as both enabling and destructive meant that
rural Karembola could both commemorate the spitefulness of vazaha in killing Malagasy
Cactus while also praising the life-sustaining qualities of new vazaha/hybrid varieties of
prickly pear.
20 Even Malagasy Cactus was drawn into this transformative symbolism. For example, many
an informant fell into raptures “remembering” a time when a cow fed on Malagasy Cactus
gave milk enough to fill two large gourds (unheard of today), enabling millet and manioc
to be regularly cooked in milk or served with curds and whey. But, they often added, “in
From Ratsiraka to Ravalomanana
Études océan Indien, 42-43 | 2012
6
those days the Tandroy were like cattle, ignorant, dirty. They didn’t grow crops, they
didn’t wear clothes, all they did was eat raketa in the woods and fight”. On the whole,
informants  emphasised  the  superiority  of  the ancestral  era  to  the  post-eradication
present but there was always this counterpoint to their narrative. Just as vazaha and their
cacti were not wholly bad, so too gasy people and raketa gasy were not wholly good.14
21 Yet  -  and  here  we  come  to  raketa’s  engagement  in  a  politics  of  rank  -  to  say  that
informants saw their new varieties of prickly pear as life-sustaining would also be too
simple because my informants frowned on high raketa dependency as a way of life. Only
the very poor, I was repeatedly told, “eat nothing but raketa”, “rubbish people, destitute
people  who  don’t  support  themselves,  don’t  accomplish  things”.  The  ideal  diet  as
stipulated by informants  was based on diversity:  manioc,  maize,  sweet  potato,  millet,
pumpkins, melons, squash, beans and peas, supplemented by curdled milk and (in due
proportion) prickly pears.  Excessive raketa eating was considered typical  of  low-born,
accursed,  deracinated people  (typically,  slaves,  vagrants,  and thieves),  lazy  good-for-
nothings  who failed to  make their  families  flourish through hard work.  In  the  then
current discourse of primordial identities, this kind of behaviour was generally ascribed
to a person’s ancestry and/or his or her “fate” or “destiny” (anjara’e).
22 These ritual  condemnations of  cactus  dependency tapped into many of  the symbolic
oppositions that were critical to Karembola selfconceptualizations, viz., between virtuous
settled farmers-herders and rootless wanderers,  between people of high ancestry and
people of low. In effect raketa consumption had a fluid position in indigenous political
discourse.  In  the  context  of  adequate  to  surplus  production,  it  was  a  morally
undetermined food, neither good nor bad. No one felt any sense of shame in eating saonjo 
away  from the  village  if  they  would  be  eating  cooked  food  at  home.  But  excessive
consumption was morally and politically devaluing. In the past, famine-driven migrations
had been the basis of a politico-symbolic hierarchy when hungry people sought refuge
with others as dependants, and even now the occasional “lost” person (the term motso 
means both “lost” and “deracinated”, and describes a sort of a social death) still turned
up, and was stereotypically discovered eating raketa on village terroir.15
23 Like  many  traditional  rural  Malagasy,  Karembola  placed  high  value  on  reproductive
prowess, that is,  on families that expand and endure through time. In the Karembola
context, these enduring families were specifically idiomised as agnatic descent groups (
tana,  hamlets),  which engage in agonistic  contests  to construct  reputation and fame.
Although  the  prestige  system,  this  “politics  of  tournaments  of  value”,  to  adopt
Appadurai’s  turn  of  phrase  (Appadurai,  1986:  50),  was  based  most  obviously  on  the
display/exchange/slaughter of livestock, transactions in vegetable foods also played an
important part in political constructions of rank. This is because local political standing
depended on the ability to host feasts and to maintain extensive networks of ceremonial
exchange, which in turn involves maintaining above average levels of crop and livestock
production. The ideal held by most Karembola was to belong to an expanding ancestry
with land and herds, and to be part of a married couple with a house and settled social
life, producing enough food to feed their family and raising enough stock to be able to
participate with honour in ritual exchange and display.
24 In  the  early  1980s  rice  (which cannot  be  grown in Karembola  and at  that  time was
nationally in short supply) was the ritual vegetable food of choice, and purchased with
money raised through the sale of surplus crops and/or stock. Raketa sonjo by contrast was
typically eaten in mundane day-to-day contexts, alone or in small groups. Prickly pears to
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my knowledge  were  never  planted  as  tone,  trees  that  commemorate  ancestors,  local
spirits, or settlement founders. Nor were they among the crops that villagers presented to
their mpisoro (priest) in “first fruits” rituals. In fact, despite its economic importance, I
never  saw raketa  sonjo  fruit  figure  in  any of  the  formal  contexts  (sacrifice,  funerals,
marriage  feasts)  in  which  Karembola  transacted  status  hierarchy  or  celebrated  the
socially reproductive processes that create enduring, expanding ancestries.16 In effect,
one might say that there were two transactional orders: a sphere of subsistence activity,
on  the  one  hand,  concerned  with  reproducing  the  individual  and  the  individual
household;  and a ritual  domain,  on the other hand,  concerned with the longer-term
reproduction of a transcendant ancestral order (cf. Parry and Bloch, 1989). And although
prickly pear fruit (in due proportion) was one of those tributory influences that helped
build ancestries (people and cattle),  a symbolic barrier kept it strictly away from the
ritual domain and confined it to the subsistence domain.
25 These contrasts between transcendant ancestry and everyday practical survival as they
pertained to raketa consumption were in turn associated with ideas about local hierarchy.
We can picture this as a series of dichotomies linking political and consumptory orders:
nobility: slaves:: high rank: low rank:: cooked foods: raw foods:: cultivated foods: wild
foods:: ritual: subsistence. Hazomanga people ate but did not rely on prickly pear.
26 In so far as prickly pear was embedded in a politics of rank, it was part of the broader re-
traditionalization of Karembola in the early 1980s. It was a way of restoring not only a
lost economy but also a lost polity. As a result, local narrative about prickly pear offered a
complex commentary on 
27 Karembola  society,  imaging a  community  based on hierarchy as  well  as  identity,  on
divergent destinies as well as shared history. Informants glossed over important social
difference  in  the  way “people  before”  experienced the  death  of  Malagasy  Cactus  by
narrating it as a collective trauma17, but reinstated social difference at the heart of their
accounts of contemporary raketa species through deprecatory references to poor people
who subsist on prickly pear.
28 I have described some of the internal inconsistencies in raketa discourses of the early
1980s but it is also worth considering how these local social and moral projects related to
the projects of the Malagasy socialist state.  To the extent that the death of Malagasy
Cactus was narrated as  a  collective trauma,  it  could be considered a typical  cultural
production of the Ratsiraka era. But insofar as Karembola ideologies of production and
exchange were concerned with reimagining a hierarchical society based on primordial
identities, they were in conflict with the stated objectives of the 1975 Malagasy Socialist
Revolution. On the surface, the conflict was not obvious. AREMA (“Antokin’ny Revolisiona
Malagasy/Avant-garde de la Révolution Malgache”, vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution,
the national political party during the Second Republic) seemed well-entrenched in this
region,  and references  to  “we the  fokonolona”  (“community”,  “collective”,  Ratsiraka’s
chosen instrument for his paradoxical policy of “top-down” selfgovernment or centralisme
démocratique (Ratsiraka, 1975: 34-39, 42; cf. Covell, 1987) saturated public discourse. But in
private most Karembola continued to maintain archaic idioms of ancestry and rank. And
one way of systematically subverting the new “socialist” order was through unremitting
references to poor people (idiomised as base ancestries) who ate nothing but prickly pear.
29 I  would  suggest  further  that  one  reason why Karembola  continued to  renarrate  the
decades-old  tragedy  of  Malagasy  Cactus  was  because  it  offered  an  oblique  way  of
critiquing the socialist regime. At first such an interpretation seems counter-intuitive
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because the death of Malagasy Cactus, narrated as an act of imperialist aggression, was so
obviously in keeping with the anti-vazaha rhetoric of the Ratsiraka state. Keen to claim a
genuine independence for itself in contrast to the so-called “false independence” under
Tsiranana, this was a regime that actively encouraged its citizens to recover memories of
colonial suffering (cf. Raison-Jourde, 1989; Cole, 2003). The truth, however, was that, six
years into Ratsiraka’s government my informants appeared to perceive no real difference
between it and earlier regimes. On the contrary, they prefaced their interactions with
government officials with expressions of abject subservience: “the land belongs to vazaha;
we’re like cattle: we can only nod in agreement when vazaha speak”. (The term vazaha 
here designates educated Malagasy from other parts of the island, typically government
officials.)  Such selfdeprecation mocked the idea of  Ratsiraka’s  Madagascar as  a  place
where Malagasy “self-govern” and perpetuated a sense of  still  belonging in the state
under duress.
30 By the early 1980s it was already clear to most Karembola that the Second Republic was
not going to restore gasy to their former prosperity but had actually deprived them of the
basic vazaha goods they remembered enjoying under Tsiranana (soap, cloth, and radio
batteries). Few Karembola still bought into the idea of a second independence. Despite a
rhetoric of decentralization (Ratsiraka, 1975: 18-19), Ratsiraka saw Malagasy peasantry as
incapable of carrying through the Socialist Revolution without close direction (Ratsiraka,
1975: 34-39, 42; cf. Covell, 1987). Thus, the master narrative of Malagasy Cactus remained
as apposite a commentary on governance and economy in the early 1980s as it had been
under colonial rule.
 
Anjedava, 1991
31 Turning to  data  collected ten years  later  in  Anjedava,  a  village  community  some 40
kilometres to the west, we find that, while the master narrative of Malagasy Cactus was
still being learned and transmitted, to most villagers issues around prickly pears in the
present were of more immediate symbolic and practical concern. Informants reported
worrying trends in the local production and consumption of prickly pears which they
situated  in  broader  cultural  understandings  of  moral,  political  and  environmental
decline.
32 In the intervening decade, a growing financial crisis in Madagascar had led to radical
changes in the direction of government policies, notably, the introduction of free market
economics  and the imposition of  structural  adjustment  programmes,  with increasing
interventions by the World Bank and IMF/FMI. These politico-economic trends had been
accompanied  by  Madagascar’s  emergence  as  a  “mega*bio+diversity  country”
(Mittermeier,  1988;  Myers,  1986)  and  had  resulted  in  Madagascar’s  first  National
Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) involving close collaboration between the Malagasy
government, local NGOs and key international players,  including the World Bank and
USAID (Richard and O’Connor, 1997: 410-1; Wright, 1997: 384-5). At the time of fieldwork
stronger nature conservation initiatives had had minimal impact in the Anjedava region.
In Spring 1991 a more immediate concern in Anjedava was the prolonged drought that
began the year before and would culminate in a grave famine by September, when at least
830,000 in “Androy” were going hungry, according to the UN World Food Programme
(WFP/ Programme Alimentaire Mondial/PAM).18
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33 Attitudes to “Malagasy Cactus” seemed familiar. Thus, most Hazohandatse I met in 1991
believed it had been an indigenous plant. The red clay soils around the village had been
favourable to the species. The very name - Anjedava - alludes to the long, twisting paths (
jilava) bordered by Malagasy Cactus that had once snaked around the settlement. And as
in Karembola ten years earlier, conversations continued to reference the colonial period
as if it were still present, and encounters with state officials evoked the same professions
of submission: “the land belongs to vazaha: we nod our heads to whatever they propose”.
Yet, while narrations seemed similar, there were significant differences in emphasis and
tone. It seemed to me that, while the loss of Malagasy Cactus was regretted, Hazohandatse
were more concerned to tell me of dangers associated with prickly pears in the present
than with recalling the trauma that followed when Malagasy Cactus died.
34 Declining rainfall was now the dominant theme in local discourse. Villagers believed that
incidents of drought were becoming more frequent, and that life was more of a struggle
as a result. Fierce winds were said to be aggravating the problem, dessicating seedlings
and  breaking  the  stems  of  maize  and  millet  plants  before  the  grain  was  ripe.  For
Karembola in the early 1980s drought and its consequences (crop failure, stock loss) had
been one among a plethora of afflictions (haoreañe) that people suffer because of moral
blame: these might included anything from losing one’s money on the way to market or
getting stung by bees through childlessness or sickness to bereavement and death. By
contrast informants in 1991 seemed to give a more specifically environmental definition
to the concept of “a dead and ruined land” (tane mate, tane robake). I would not want to
exaggerate  the  differences.  Even in  the  early  1980s  people  had  mentioned declining
rainfall and poor harvests as aspects of their distance/alienation from ancestral space/
time. It seemed to me, however, that where informants in the early 1980s had taken some
pride in their “thirsty” land - aridity was an innate property of Karembola territory and
coping with it was what distinguished them as Karembola from outsiders - informants a
decade later consistently identified a long-term trend of aridification and stressed their
inability to cope.
35 In contrast to the early 1980s when informants portrayed themselves as returning to
ancestral ways of working the land, informants now reported many negative trends in
local farming practice. These included shortening fallows, the loss of “ancient” woodland,
a “modern” and not entirely welcome mania for raketa sonjo planting, and invasion by a
“bandit” prickly pear. As many villagers saw it, Hazohandatse were behaving increasingly
like vazaha: breaking landscape taboos by clearing sacred forest, showing disrespect for
traditional  authority,  and  transgressing  burial  customs  and  incest  taboos.  More
particularly,  they  claimed  that  they  were  deviating  from  “horticultural  custom”  by
cultivating foreign cacti in “new”, non-ancestral ways, and, more strikingly still,  that
raketa  dependency  was  ballooning  out  of  control.  As  in  the  early  1980s,  informants
associated excessive cactuseating with devalued persons such as “bandits”, refugees, and
slaves. The difference between past and present, Hazohandatse felt, was that whereas in
the past food insecurity had been a periodic event affecting particular hakeo-stricken
individuals, it was now becoming a quasi-permanent condition afflicting everyone. Even
nobility had lost its asy and teetered on the edge of destitution, “eating raketa like slaves”.
19 Thus to an ecological calamity was added a political crisis.
36 Perhaps because declining harvests were thought to be undermining hierarchy by driving
everyone into raketa  dependency,  there was  greater  ambivalence about  the status  of
raketa as a food. Whereas informants ten years earlier had listed saonjo fruits among the
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“ancestral” staples and “proper foods” with other cultivars, villagers now more often
classed them as  hatsa  or tindroke,  with wild-growing emergency foods  (fruits,  tubers,
birds, and small mammals) that people look for in the woods when agricultural systems
failed. Such symbolism, which put the plant outside the domain of human endeavour into
wild, uncultivated space (amonto), was reinforced by perceived differences between the
properties of “hot” and “cold” foods. Essentially, raketa was classed as a “cold” food, with
watermelons and cucumbers, food that is eaten raw, on the hoof, generally outside the
village, during the day when the sun is high in the sky. Normally, only the destitute ate
raketa of an evening. Most Hazohandatse returning to the village after sundown expected
to eat a “proper meal” of hot, cooked food (maize, manioc,....). Similar conceptualizations
had been present in the early 1980s but the articulation of short-term and long-term
strategies for growing ancestries had been less problematic then. Despite the scarcity of
consumer goods and rampant price inflation, rural Karembola had been managing their
fiction of a ranked society rather well. Ten years on, radical changes in the direction of
government policies, notably, the withdrawal of state subsidies, the decline of Malagasy
socialism, the introduction of free market economics and the imposition of structural
adjustment programmes, had dramatically increased the availability of consumer goods
in the island but had pauperized many rural communities. More specifically, fieldwork
was conducted in drought conditions at a time of increasing hardship in the run up to the
1991/1992 famine. It is also possible that there had been more long-term environmental
decline.20 Whatever the reasons, with a food that was once a staple for the destitute and/
or the ritually dependant becoming everybody’s staple, informants seemed determined to
maintain  raketa’s  symbolic  opposition  as  a  short-term subsistence  food  to  cherished
longer-term values of status and wealth creation by stressing their reluctance to store the
fruit in their granaries overnight.
37 The reconceptualisation of prickly pear as tindroke was also linked with a self-reported
shift  in  raketa  planting  away  from  sites  of  concentrated  human  activity.  Whereas
Karembola had linked raketa intimately to lived-in social places, villagers at Anjedava
cited a reluctance to plant the traditional multi-purpose cactus hedging around garden-
plots and hamlets, explaining that they didn’t like to have raketa sonjo too close to where
people lived or worked because the “fearsome spines” could easily take out an eye or
make a person lame. In strong winds the “hairs” blew onto people, causing eye infections
and wounds.  Conversely,  when the wind died down,  conditions inside a prickly pear
enclosure became too hot to bear. For similar reasons informants took a dim view of the
traditional  “hamlet  within  the  raketa”.  Instead  of  desiring  the  prickly  pear-enclosed
spaces  practised  by  their  ancestors,  people  now  valued  clarity  in  and  around  their
homesteads: they wanted things to be “open”, not “dark” and “full of trees”.
38 Instead a preference was expressed for planting raketa sonjo on firefallows in the woods.
39 Perceived as pre-eminently vazaha practice,  this was supposed to be more productive
since soils where tall trees had been fired would crop sooner and the young cladodes were
less likely to be nibbled by village goats. Yet it was typical of the retrograde dynamic in
which Hazohandatse imagined themselves to be imprisoned that the longer-term costs of
these innovations were thought to negate any short-term benefits. Not only had “first
rate land” (fanjaka tane), which ought to be earmarked for maize or millet, been “wasted”
on prickly pears, but native woodland, a vital part of the socio-ecosystem that provides
browse and shade for livestock, woodfuel, timber, fibres, herbal remedies, and foods, was
being lost. The practice aroused particular moral opprobrium when, with the connivance
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of  “Eaux  et  Fôrets”,  wayward  individuals  (usually,  the  landhungry  poor)  broke
longstanding taboos by clearing plots in sacred ancient woodland. Informants saw these
“modern” trends in raketa-planting as symptomatic of the way vazaha had desacralized
the landscape: “ ’Today there are no prohibitions’, the vazaha tell us, ‘for it’s a foreign
land!’ ”. Another aspect of vazaha rule that was driving the practice of raketa tavy was the
fact that the vazaha who settled land disputes (generally the local garde de forêt) only
recognised  rights  in  cleared  and  cultivated  land.  This  was  driving  many  land-rich
villagers to put tracts of forest down to raketa in order to maintain visible long-term
ownership in patrimonial fallows against landshort farmers who “laid claim to land to
which they were not  entitled and then appealed to  the  state  when judgement  went
against  them in  local  courts”.21 Another  allegedly  “modern”  form of  raketa-planting
involved the creation of “proto-paddocks”. This embryonic enclosure movement was seen
as overturning long-standing traditions of common access grazing land.
40 In short, far from “newcomer” prickly pears having become more “ancestral” since the
early 1980s, there was now greater uncertainty about how they fitted into local cultural
traditions than before. Whereas informants in the early 1980s had seemed at ease with
their vazaha or hybrid cacti and the proxy ancestrality they had secured, informants in
1991 associated these new varieties with impending political and environmental disaster.
41 Nothing  better  captures  this  sense  of  approaching  apocalypse  than  discourse  on  a
recently arrived and fast-spreading Opuntia. Known locally as raketa mena (“red prickly
pear”) on account of the fruit colour, it was considered the most opportunistic of all the
prickly pears they had known. While there appears to be no specific indigenous category
that translates directly as the English term “weed”, informants deployed a range of verbs
and adjectives when speaking about raketa mena to convey the idea of a plant with “bad
habits” that was spreading without human assistance, and becoming a nuisance, a pest
they  couldn’t  control.  In  a  culture  which still  subscribed to  the  value  of  primordial
identities, where ancestry was assumed to dictate the habits or character (fomba’e) of a
person or thing, uncertainty over its provenance only increased anxiety about the plant.
Apparently unrelated to the familiar raketa species, raketa mena was termed a “bandit”, a
“stranger”, rootless, dangerous, and sinister. Bristling with long yellow spines, it was one
of the few plants that could regenerate on “hot”, stony terrain around the village where
heavy grazing by goats otherwise allowed only a few unpalatable indigenous weed species
to survive. It was the very antithesis of the productive prickly pear: its barbed spines
caused fatal swellings, the cladodes made a dangerous fodder, and the fruit was poorly
rated as a human food, though in 1991 as other food supplies dwindled, it was eaten in
increasing quantities, first by children, whose swollen bellies bore telltale red stains, and
then by adults. The plant’s only virtue was that it made a superb hedge “that even keeps
sokake [Geochelone radiata, the supersize endemic tortoise+ from getting at our crops”; but
this was a double-edged virtue because the plant’s widespread use as hedging was also
assisting it to spread.
42 For Hazohandatse in the last year of the Second Republic the habits of this unsourced
raketa were an augury of harder times to come. While early 1980s imagery of raketa had
placed them in a profoundly socialized landscape of subsistence and surplus production,
by 1991 the encroachment by raketa mena into social spaces, together with the movement
of raketa sonjo plantings away from social spaces onto forest burns, was recasting prickly
pear as an anti-social  plant.  Whereas in the early 1980s informants had associated a
heavy-but-not-too-heavy reliance on raketa (generic) with the partial recovery of a lost
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ancestral economy, practices around the production and consumption of raketa (generic)
were now portrayed as negations of tradition and linked with declining productivity, land
degradation and poverty. In some ways raketa mena epitomised these negative processes
and  was  symbolically  opposed  to  raketa  sonjo.  But  at  another  level  both  symbolised
current dilemmas - it was only a matter of degrees. Both varieties helped “to stave off
hunger” but heavy and increasing reliance on them was indicative of a “ruined land”, of
people caught in deepening cycles of drought and famine. This paradox was captured in a
popular  dictum:  “raketa  makes  us  live;  raketa  also  kills”.  Chaotic  and  beneficial,  an
instrument for survival, an instrument of death, species meanings underwent contextual
negotiation as they were combined and recombined to describe political and ecological
transformations that Hazohandatse feared would end in their own extinction.
43 It is the light of the perceived imminent collapse of hierarchy under the ecological and
political impacts of vazaha values that we can understand my companion’s reaction to the
audacious “slaves” who had planted raketa with the intention of selling it on to stock
owners. Despite the increasing tendency to associate raketa discursively with wild spaces,
raketa saonjo was in practice still an owned and limited resource which acquired a rising
market value in times of fodder/fruit scarcity. The prolonged drought in 1991 had already
forced many larger stockowners to buy in extra supplies of raketa to feed their herds at
some expense (typical payments were five thousand Malagasy francs or a cow-with-calf).
It was this perceived vulnerability of richer farmers to growing drought incidence that
the good-for-nothing inhabitants of “the hamlet within the raketa” sought to exploit.
44 Producing  raketa  for  fodder,  turning  it  into  money  and  cattle,  and  ultimately  into
prestige,  were  all  perfectly  legitimate  activities  (Karembola  have  seldom  expressed
disquiet  about  material  acquisition or  the  pursuit  of  monetary  gain)  but  not  when
undertaken by “slaves”. It was acceptable for “slaves” to subsist on raketa. Indeed, the
monotonous consumption of raketa was a wholly appropriate moral activity for the lower
orders that usefully confirmed the enduring relevance of indigenous idioms of hierarchy
in a “foreign land”.22 But when people of slave descent grow prickly pear with an eye to
speculating  on  escalating  drought  incidence,  they forget  their  proper  place  in  the
accepted  status  hierarchy  and  confirm  that  they  are  “worthless  men  who  show  no
respect”.23
45 It is tempting to postulate a symbolic link between the growing impunity of ondevo to
offend against status hierarchy and the wildness now ascribed to prickly pear. So long as
prickly pear was confined to the shortterm sphere concerned with the basic viability of
the individual household, and subordinated to the reproduction of the hierarchical order,
it was beneficial; but with prickly pear now figuring in vazaha-backed challenges to the
hereditary land rights of local élites, it had become something of a wild card jeopardizing
the material bases of hierarchy.
46 An interesting contrast can be drawn with the early 1980s when villagers who subsisted
on prickly pear were despised, but their practice did not impact on other stakeholders’
interests. The varieties then available served the rich (fodder and fruit) and the poor
(fruit-consumers) equally well,  and their uses were largely compatible because it  was
labour, not land, that was scarce. By contrast, in 1991 raketa planting involved incipient
conflicts over resource use between poor and rich. These conflicts took place within the
context  of  a  broader  debate  about  the  relative  importance  of  primordial  identity
(ancestry) over performance in the here-and-now in establishing personal worth.
 
From Ratsiraka to Ravalomanana
Études océan Indien, 42-43 | 2012
13
“ We’re all capitalists now! ”
47 The subtle representational shifts that had taken place between the early 1980s and the
early 1990s required careful unpicking partly because the narrative of Malagasy Cactus
remained recognizably the same. Returning to the field in 2002-2003, I was genuinely
shocked to discover that,  while the basic storyline about the French killing Malagasy
Cactus persisted, not everybody saw this intervention as bad. People now disputed all
aspects of the story: whether “Malagasy Cactus” had been invasive; whether the French
had been right  to  kill  it;  whether  local  people  had also desired its  eradication;  and,
perhaps most startling of all, whether anyone had actually died or suffered as a result. In
less than a generation, widely shared memory and interpretation of events had given way
to surprisingly diverse narrative about the past.
48 Two  key  developments  had  contributed  to  these  renarrations:  an  acrimonious
controversy that had erupted over raketa mena24; and a popular discourse on vazaha and
foreign investment in the context of recent elections that made the nationalist narrative
of Malagasy Cactus appear (to many people) less resonant than before.
49 In the intervening years, the shift from socialist to neo-liberal economics and the rise of
biodiversity  discourse  had  continued.  Increasingly  vocal  opposition  to  Ratsiraka  had
brought about the appointment of a transitional government in late 1992. Following a
brief interlude under Zafy Albert who was removed from office in 1996, Ratsiraka was re-
elected to the Presidency in 1997, only to cede power in 2001 to Marc Ravalomanana, a
pro-vazaha  candidate  committed  to  free  market  solutions  and  foreign  investment.
Inbetween times,  the so-called “spiny dry forest” of  Androy-Karembola-Mahafale had
been defined as a global conservation priority on account of its exceptional endemism
and  degree  of  threat.  With  [eco]tourism  projected  to  be  a  major  earner  of  foreign
exchange for the national economy (World Bank, 1990; McNeely et al, 1990), the ’90s had
seen intensified “conservation” controls in the “Réserve Spéciale du Cap Sainte Marie”,
the only nature reserve located in Karembola but  one which had been more or  less
neglected since  its  creation in  1962 (Nicoll  & Langrand,  1989,  123-5).  By  2002,  these
interventions were impacting negatively on resource use in communities bordering the
reserve, while offering little in the way of improved economic and social conditions to
compensate.
50 The anti-prickly pear lobby had remained relatively silent in Ratsiraka’s Second Republic.
Ecosystem inventories of  Madagascar published in the 1980s generally gloss over the
issue of naturalised Opuntia in the Malagasy Deep South (Jenkins, 1987; Nicoll & Langrand,
1989, 124, 178). However, the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and the subsequent Convention
on Biodiversity (CBD) to which Madagascar was a signatory, had defined exotic plants as
one  of  the  most  serious  threats to  global  biodiversity.  This  had  emboldened
conservationists to articulate opposition to introduced Opuntia on the grounds of their
alleged impacts on “southern Didiereaceae-Euphorbia bush” (Rauh, 1995, 55; Rauh, 1998,
xi). The WWF [World Wide Fund for Nature] was targeting raketa mena in particular for its
impacts  on biodiversity  within  Cap Sainte  Marie  Special  Reserve  and on subsistence
farming on the periphery of the Reserve (ANGAP et al, n.d. [2001]; Randriamampianina et
al,  2002).  The integration of development and environmental  concerns had become a
stated priority for key stakeholders in Madagascar, and a campaign against raketa mena,
which benefited from some local support, appeared to offer the WWF a way of delivering
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on this. Ravalomanana, the newly elected President, was underscoring his expectation
that  environmental  NGOs  would  make  an  important  contribution,  alongside  foreign
investment and the private sector, to achieving millenium goals of poverty eradication
and economic growth.
51 The WWF had, however, overplayed its hand in claiming that its position on raketa mena
coincided with community opinion. Certainly most villagers I interviewed agreed that
raketa mena was infesting fields and grazing lands with negative impacts on agro-pastoral
productivity. However, local opinion was deeply divided over what should happen to the
plant.  Some  (generally,  more  affluent  community  members)  called  for  its  total
eradication. But others (generally the poor) protested that, at a time of food insecurity,
raketa mena fruit, and it alone, was keeping them alive. Debate was particularly heated
because,  during  discussions  with  community  leaders,  vazaha  (personnel  from  WWF,
ANGAP, and FOFIFA, the three organizations collaborating on the issue)25 had apparently
promised to introduce insects to kill the plant.
52 As a result of this controversy, it had become almost impossible for local informants to
narrate the story of Malagasy Cactus without inserting a meta-commentary that drew
comparisons and/or contrasts to raketa mena. (This meta-commentary covered anything
from the botanical characteristics and economic value of the two species to what might
be predicted about the consequences of raketa mena eradication on the basis of  what
happened when Malagasy Cactus died.)  With the WWF seeking the authority and the
funding to push forward a programme of eradication/control for raketa mena, men and
women, even those who had experienced Malagasy Cactus in person, were developing
new Malagasy Cactus narrative as arguments in contemporary debates. While it would be
wrong to over-generalize,  broadly speaking the story had been appropriated and re-
narrated to serve the conflicting political and economic interests of rich and poor.
53 Yet at another level, when compared to the rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s, there were,
or seemed to be, deeper shifts in cultural understandings of personhood, work and status
that  revealed  much common ground between the  protagonists.  Few informants  now
expressed any longing for some golden era associated with raketa gasy; their nostalgia was
overwhelmingly for the colonial period when, as one man explained, the French did their
best “to get us to prosper with all kinds of schemes, butter beans, rubber, things which if
they had succeeded would be keeping us alive today”. Even the collective raketa vazaha
plantations of the 1950s through to the 1970s, once indicted as exemplifying the “forced
labour” or “slavery” people had suffered under colonialism, were now portrayed by many
informants as good. Insisting that people in Karembola had been paid for their labour and
that ownership of the plantations had devolved onto local collectivities, many informants
mourned the failure of these communal undertakings, attributing it to the selfishness of
wealthier cattle-owners who “ruined” what was intended to feed ordinary people (hane
vahoake) by allowing their stock to graze the plantations without regard for sustainability
over the long-term.
54 In many ways, this nostalgia for state-driven collective labour seemed to belong more to
the Ratsiraka era than to Ravalomanana’s Madagascar.26 And indeed another narrative
circulating in 2002-03 was more in keeping with the Ravalomanana ethos. The question
had arisen of  whether the World Food Programme/Programme Alimentaire Mondiale
could be persuaded to sponsor raketa planting under its “Food for Work” programmes; to
date  participants  in  these  schemes  had  mostly  worked  on  improving  footpaths,
waterpoints, and schools. Many informants were adamant: while they or others would
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willingly prepare the soil and plant cladodes in exchange for butter beans and maize if
they were hungry,  the plantations would be unsustainable  in the long term because
“Tandroy  today  are  capitalist”  and  would  only  invest  their  (additional)  labour  on
“private” on-farm plots.
55 In  short,  there  were  two  conflicting  narratives  about  prickly  pear  circulating  in
2002-2003. The one pedalled the value of state-driven, state-imposed collective endeavour
as epitomised in the ideal of the lost raketa vazaha plantations of the colonial and “neo-
colonial” periods that would nowadays be carrying the population through drought and
famine if only local élites had not exploited the resource for their own advantage with
complete disregard to community needs. The other bought into the rhetoric of private
enterprise as epitomised by the (late colonial  period) ideal of the individually owned
raketa vazaha plot,  hedged against appropriation by others (the antithesis of common
grazing) and profitable for its owner, though always at risk of being ruined by raketa mena
(a “bandit” valued only by good-for-nothings) and by careless herders who allow their
stock  to  roam.  We  can  see  these  two  ideals  as  replicating  in  miniature  a  clash  of
philosophies, and possible routes for Madagascar.
56 Whether they were for or against raketa mena, both sides believed in the transformative
agency of vazaha, a belief still founded on (now very confused) memory of the Malagasy
Cactus campaign. But, and here they deviated from the sentiments of the “nationalist”
narrative of Malagasy Cactus, both sides were strongly pro-vazaha (the term vazaha in this
context now reverting to its original meaning of people from outside Madagascar). All
protagonists believed that vazaha-sourced benefits were readily available and would flow
freely into the Karembola economy if  only national and regional  politicians could be
stopped from diverting the benefits into their own pockets. No one I spoke to referenced
the colonial period as if it were still present; maintaining a distinction between selfless
(non-Malagasy) vazaha (European, Japanese...) and grasping Malagasy élites was now the
dominant concern.
57 The pro-vazaha rhetoric  reflected more general  trends in Madagascar  as  the relative
isolation and deprivation of the socialist era gave way to the economic liberalisation of
the 1990s. However, in changing attitudes in the extreme south, the 1991-1992 famine had
been particularly  transformative  because  it  had  spurred vazaha  interventions  in  this
region on an unprecedented scale. Emergency food relief, followed up by development
projects, provided by a multitude of agencies, had encouraged local people to see vazaha 
as a source of wealth. Community leaders now regularly declared that they were “looking
for a partner” from outside Madagascar, be it in the form of a large-scale European Union
initiative or a smaller NGO project.
58 There  had  been  concomitant  shifts  in  attitudes  to  raketa  vazaha  and raketa  sonjo.  In
contrast to the 1980s when these “modern” varieties had been both compared to and
contrasted with the lost “ancestral” cactus, informants now unreservedly classed both as
“ancestral”, on a par with Malagasy Cactus. Both were described as plants that “make
things  flourish”,  foods  that  “truly  nourish”,  “people’s  true  food”.  Indeed,  some
informants, mainly those who were using a re-narrated history of Malagasy Cactus to
argue  for  raketa  mena  eradication,  portrayed  these  “ancestral-vazaha”  varieties  as
superior to raketa gasy itself.
59 The  extended  discourse  on  sonjo  and  vazaha  as  a  channel  for  expressing  a  wider
discomfort about métissage that had been current in the 1980s through the 1990s had
dissipated. Whereas for Hazohandatse c.1991 raketa mena, raketa soso and raketa vazaha had
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all symbolised, to varying degrees and in different ways, perceived dilemmas of poverty
and impotency in a foreign land, any negativity was now projected wholly onto raketa
mena the “bandit”. Viewed as a completely alien raketa devoid of local ties, raketa mena
was seen (even by the poor who depended on it to survive) as socially destructive: luring
people by its short-term benefits into practices that would end ultimately in a barren
land.
60 As ever, ideas about prickly pear consumption were linked to social value. But it was now
excessive raketa mena eating that denoted low rank. The wealthy described those who
depended on raketa mena as lazy, impecunious, and profligate: “They don’t keep livestock,
raise fowl, they don’t bother with cultivating land. All they do is pick wild raketa mena”.
The verb used -mitsindroke (to harvest wild fruit and tubers) - was also used to refer to
harvesting raketa sonjo  in the woods.  Yet raketa saonjo  consumption had very distinct
political connotations to raketa mena consumption. There had been a significant shift in
cultural perceptions since the 1980s and 1990s. A heavy consumption of raketa saonjo was
now perfectly acceptable regardless of a person’s status and resource availability. Raketa
mena dependency had become the indicator of inferior rank. As one informant noted:
61 Even if harvests are good, we still eat vast quantities of saonjo.  Everyone’s completely
sated with field crops, but they’re still out in the woods eating saonjo. Whereas in a good
year raketa mena has no value. No one eats it; it just falls to ground.
62 Raketa  saonjo  was  now  so  “ancestral”  that  in  communities  nearer  to  Tôlañaro  (Fort
Dauphin)  it  was (mistakenly)  known as  raketa  gasy.27 As  for  raketa  vazaha,  which had
formerly trailed raketa sonjo in moral evaluation, informants could not praise it highly
enough. Its name invariably headed the species lists I  collected, and informants’ only
regret was that they could not plant or maintain enough. It - more than any other variety
– was contrasted favourably with the dastardly raketa mena as “good, smooth, spineless.
It’s an ancestral plant!” Like Malagasy Cactus and raketa saonjo before it, raketa vazaha had
been finally “ancestralized”. But whereas Malagasy Cactus and raketa sonjo were ciphers of
a subsistence economy - both were conceptualised as satisfying basic human needs for
food, water, shelter, and good health - raketa vazaha was all about commoditization. The
fruit had long involved a form of conspicuous consumption. But it was now highly rated
from the producer angle as a cash crop. As such, it was emphatically contrasted to raketa
sonjo which was generally portrayed as tindroke that people guzzle to their hearts’ content
in  the  woods.  Both  plants  were  believed  to  foster  health  and  prosperity  but  by
symbolically contrastive routes.28
63 In contrast to the deep sense of foreboding that had coloured attitudes in 1991, the tone
informants  adopted  when  they  talked  about  raketambazaha  commodification  was
strikingly upbeat. Whereas Hazohandatse had focused on ominous developments in raketa
planting  driven  by  economic  necessity,  people  now  seemed  to  be  celebrating  the
possibility of new economic directions in response to market incentives.29 Raketa vazaha
cultivation on the deeply manured soils of former cattle pens (advocated by the colonial
extension services since the 1950s but whose difficulties had formerly captured local
people’s sense of impotency as gasy in a foreign land) in many ways exemplified the new
self-definition: “Tandroy are all capitalists now”.
64 Yet the truth was that only a tiny number of farmer-herders in 2002-3 actually produced
raketa  vazaha  for  sale.  Livelihoods  remained  precarious.  The  economic  reality  of
complexities  and challenges faced by most  rural  Karembola in the early  twenty-first
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century  was  more  truthfully  encapsulated  in  the  raketa  saonjo-raketa  mena  pairing.
Existence was still about eating saonjo harvested for free in the woods. Those losing the
battle against raketa mena in their paddocks and garden plots outnumbered, and by far,
the  few  who  maintained  a  fine  raketa  vazaha  orchard.  There  had  been  no  agrarian
revolution:  the majority of  households had not made the shift  from subsistence food
production to cash cropping; many relied on the WFP/PAM when subsistence agriculture
failed. As for ceremonial exchanges, a grinding poverty meant that by 2002 increasing
numbers of hamlets were no longer building tombs and had not done so for some years.
The mortuary rituals that in the 1980s and early 1990s had provided the opportunity for
ordinary people to try their hand at “refreshing” their wealth (only the very poor had
been precluded from participation), were now out of reach for all but the very rich.
65 No one glossed the fact that raketambazaha was more demanding to cultivate than other
varieties, more demanding than ever now that the plots required constant weeding to
keep  them free  of  raketa  mena  which  rapidly  infests  former  stock-pens.  Only  a  few
households in the region had sufficient labour, or managed their available labour well
enough, to maintain a fine raketa vazaha plot producing fruit to sell. But in many ways
raketambazaha production was idealised precisely because it  epitomised the virtues of
hard work, skilful management of household labour, successful entrepreneurship and its
perceived reward,  cash  income.  The  successful  raketambazaha  producer  coupled  local
knowledge of ecological conditions with vazaha-type market knowledge. He or she was a
person who knew how to sell scarce produce in a rising market, unlike the majority of
farmers who sold their surplus produce too cheaply when food was plenty and then had
to sell their cattle at depressed prices at times of food scarcity in order to buy it back. It
typified the self-reliant, self-contained household which demonstrates its worth by cash
cropping, and no longer has to depend on manipulating corpses, and the multiple kinship
links corpses embody, in order “to see wealth” through ritual exchange.30 The successful
raketambazaha  producer  was  the  indigenized  Karembola  version  of  Ravalomanana’s
“capitalist”.
66 Jennifer Cole suggests that one effect of neoliberal economics in urban Tamatave (East
Coast Madagascar) has been to make the relationship between short-term transactions
and long term cycles of reproduction increasingly problematic as new social hierarchies
based more on money than ancestry emerge in response to the opportunities brought by
recent economic changes (Cole, 2003). With its concomitants of market production, the
decline of collective control over natural resources, and individualization in economic
behaviour,  the  emergence  of  raketa  vazaha  producers  in  Karembola  seemed  to  raise
similar questions about the symbolic articulation of money and ancestry. Yet, in contrast
to  the  hostility  shown to  “slaves”  in  Anjedava  whose  attempts  to  commodify  raketa 
threatened the social order, the trading activities of the raketambazaha producer couples I
studied appeared to be generally admired. No one expressed to me the opinion that their
profit-oriented behaviour was morally problematic or disruptive of community bonds.
The  fact  is  that  in  Karembola  cash  in  itself  is  not  seen  as  inherently  opposed  to
“traditional”, ancestry-based modes of reproduction.
67 It only becomes problematic when the socially ascendant use it in transformational ways.
31 And from the socio-demographic data I collected it appeared that the few households
engaged  in  raketambazaha  commodification  in  2002  were  not  associated  with  the
emergence of new social hierarchies. Their immunity to social criticism reflected their
secure membership in “aristocratic” descent lines as much as general moral approval of
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the successful private entrepreneur. In other words, while the way informants enthused
about  growing  raketambazaha  for  sale  could  lead  one  mistakenly  to  think  that
raketambazaha commodification had become a route to social mobility, this was not in fact
the  case.32 Karembola  élites  have  been  remarkably  successful  in  consolidating  their
positions by exploiting new political and economic opportunities, including those offered
by multiple types of clientelism with international/parastatal disaster relief and nature
conservation agencies (WFP/PAM, WWF, ANGAP, etc).33
68 The idealised and rather self-deceptive self-identification of all Karembola as emergent
capitalists appeared to chime with the Ravalomanana ethos, but was difficult to square
with the reality of life as experienced by most men and women in Karembola today. And
indeed if one looked more closely at what informants were saying, ideas were deeply
divided on what “capitalism”’ and greater co-operation with vazaha actually meant. Some,
mainly those in favour of raketa mena eradication who saw vazaha and their instrumental
knowledge  as  vital  allies  in  the  eradication  of  a  weed  that  was  beyond  their  own
capability  to  control,  were  indeed  affirming  faith  in  the  power  of  market  solutions
coupled with an indigenous capitalism to enrich people and redress food insecurity. For
instance,  when I  asked whether  raketa  mena eradication would result  in  a  famine as
happened in the 1930s after raketa gasy died, many insisted that the situation today would
be altogether different because “in those days there were no markets at Soamanitse and
Marovato whereas nowadays there’s money, transport, you can buy in food”. But others,
especially poorer villagers, saw vazaha (rather like raketa mena) more as providers of food
aid and other acts of charity when local food security systems failed.
69 Raketambazaha commoditization as a phenomenon of neo-liberal economics existed more
as discourse than practice. And as a discourse on neo-liberalism it was conjoined to an
equally rapturous but better-founded discourse on raketa saonjo as wild, gathered food.
The rise of the ideal of the raketambazaha producer might encapsulate the slow surrender
of  “socialist”  goals  to  neo-liberalism,  a  process  that  culminated  in  Ravalomanana’s
ascendancy in 2001. Yet raketa saonjo, a “wonderful food” harvested in the wood, restated
the value of non-commodity forms.34 This discursive parity between raketa saonjo and 
raketambazaha,  as two completely different conceptualizations of  economy,  in a sense
encapsulated policy options as they were envisioned for the Deep South. Agricultural
production to satisfy Madagascar’s basic needs had been a stated primary objective of the
1975 Revolution (Ratsiraka, 1975: 55-57, 60, 72, 102). This had never been achieved yet
Ravalomanana stood for more than the satisfaction of finite wants and the restoration of
self-sufficiency.  Just  as  1980s  narrative  around  prickly  pear  could  be  seen  as  both
Ratsiraka-authorized text and unauthorised critique, so too the narratives of the early
2000s  can be  seen as  toying  equivocally,  even parodically,  with  the  ideas  of  private
enterprise that had brought Ravalomanana to power.35 Despite having presided over the
introduction of free market economics in the 1980s, Ratsiraka had been reconfigured as
one of the “good, enlightened vazaha who piggy-back Tandroy” (mibabe) in times of need.
He was now widely praised for bringing water and food aid to the Karembola region.
Judgement on Ravalomanana was temporarily suspended. He was a “newcomer” whose
fomba was unknown, much as raketa mena had been in 1991. Villagers were still uncertain
what his ascendancy to power would mean for them.36
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Some Reflections
70 The cultivation of prickly pears is often portrayed as an essentially pragmatic response to
the challenges of farming and herding in arid conditions. Such approaches, while clearly
offering vital insights, can produce an essentialist, somewhat unvarying, picture of raketa 
practice and raketa discourse that takes insufficient account of time or locality.37 It can
also assume a consensus within local communities that may not exist.  This essay has
shown how moral evaluations of raketa, far from devolving solely onto purely practical
issues, were finely nuanced for species and for historical period, and intimately linked to
understandings  of  the  political  order  and  environmental  change.  The  values  and
meanings ascribed to prickly pears were not inherent, immutable, or wholly objective,
but  rather  judgements  made  about  them by  subjects  in  the  context  of  political  and
economic  interest  informed  by  culturally  constructed  notions  of  production,
consumption, and exchange.38
71 In all three communities, the ways in which raketa varieties are symbolically represented
took on performative meaning in the context of contested moral and political claims
involving ideological and material conflicts both within local communities and between
local communities and the nation state.  These ideological and material conflicts have
been reconfigured over the two decades in response to political and economic trends.
72 Open dissent was missing from narrative I collected in the early 1980s. There was social
dissonance in the references to filthy raketa-eating gasy in the past  and to good-for-
nothings who subsisted on cactus in the present, but these were not elaborated as conflict
between community members in the present. Practical engagement with raketa in the
present was unproblematic: Malagasy Cactus was dead, raketa mena was not yet a pest
putting livelihoods at risk, and with respect to raketa sonjo the interests of the poor and
the rich were not in direct conflict. On the contrary, it suited popular opinion, at a time
when Karembola political  philosophy remained fiercely hierarchical  but references to
ondevo could not be freely voiced, to be able to point at destitutes who survived on cactus
fruit. These living embodiments of worthlessness became, as it were, tangible proof of a
partly imagined hierarchy based on descent. With land in seemingly inexhaustible supply,
Opuntia species were not implicated in contested access to land. The master narrative of
Malagasy Cactus was critical  to collective and personal self-conceptualization but the
conflicts  it  narrated  had  become  more  allegorical  or  mythical  than  actual,  at  best
metaphors for current battles with Ratsiraka regime. Despite evident disparities of wealth
and opportunity  between individual  households,  this  could  be  a  consensual  memory
because community conflicts over labour, land and livestock did not turn around prickly
pears.
73 By 2002-3 raketa  varieties  and raketa  histories  were once again directly  embroiled in
battles  for  survival,  with  the  poor  championing  raketa  mena  and  the  more  affluent
championing its eradication expressing typically antagonistic interests. By contrast to the
1980s,  when  the  wealthy  welcomed  the  presence  of  poor  people  (idiomised  as  base
ancestries) who ate nothing but prickly pear because it confirmed the validity of
hierarchical ideology and their own position within it, the wealthy now resented those
who ate nothing but raketa mena because the latter’s practice conferred social use value
on a plant that was impacting negatively on their own productivity. And in so far as
superior rank was based on productive prowess and ritual performance based largely on
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productive prowess, the value the poor conferred on raketa mena was undermining the
material base of privilege. The idea of a collective trauma experienced in the 1920s when
Malagasy Cactus died, so pronounced in the early 1980s, had been fractured as diverse
factions used Malagasy Cactus narrative to promote competing interests.
74 1991 can be seen as a transitional period when the narrative of Malagasy Cactus had
become less  relevant  in  the  light  of  more  pressing  dilemmas  around modern raketa 
varieties  but  those  current  dilemmas  had  not  yet  led  people  to  revisit  the  master
narrative and harness it to serving their internal disputes. Sorry tales of raketa past and
present  that  evoked  a  sense  of  historic  loss  and  imminent  catastrophe  were  still
embedded in a broader politics of generic identity, partly masking those occasions when
stands of prickly pear figured in land disputes.
75 In  all  three  communities  the  ways  people  thought  about  raketa  varieties  had  some
connection  to  the  specific  material  conditions  of  production  in  which  they  were
embedded, most notably the ecological and social-economic relations that condition land
and labour supply.  While this is a complex issue which needs further investigation, I
loosely  hypothesise  a  shift  from  the  consensual  positive  attitude  to  raketa  that
characterised a lowdensity agro-pastoral system in the early 1980s through the more
critical conceptualizations of raketa in Anjedava 1991 at a time when growing scarcity of
land was accelerating “class” conflict, to the deep contestation of opinion in Cap Sainte
Marie  2002-2003  where,  due  to  various  factors,  including both encroachment  by  the
nature reserve and infestation by raketa mena, land supply had become a critical problem.
76 These raketa histories also appeared to reference changing constructions of personhood.
In all three settings people were conscious of socio-economic diversity; but the idea of
Tandroy as “capitalist” rewarded for effort in the present rather than qualities conferred
by the past, together with the increased tendency to describe social difference more in
terms  of  contrasts  between  “rich”  and  “poor”,  the  “worthy”  and  “worthless”,  the
“industrious”  and  the  “lazy”,  than  between  roandria  and  ondevo,  the  vocabulary  of
hereditary rank, implies that there was by 2002 a greater acceptance of social mobility
than before.  Supporting evidence for a shift  from primordial  to more fluid identities
might be found in the general  secularization or westernization of  popular discourse.
Mystifying  models  of  spiritual  power  (hakeo,  asy,...)  which  had  dominated  everyday
conversation in the early 1980s and 1990s were now less frequently vocalized in public.
For example, instead of describing raketa mena as an intervention of supernatural powers
in the world of the living against which they were impotent to act, villagers in 2002-2003
generally verbalised the infestations as a grave but essentially secular and potentially
reversible predicament which could be overcome with the instrumental knowledge that
vazaha typically provide.
77 This new language of social mobility was, however, deceptive because as we have seen
there had been a retrenchment of elite power. Most local community leaders (Komity, 
Presiday,...)  were wealthy men from superior lineages who had gained these positions
because of their skill in combining a secular discourse that was accessible to vazaha with a
“traditionalist”  discourse  intended  for  internal  consumption  that  drew  on  values  of
ancestry and references to the past.39
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NOTES
1.  Tanañe ampo raket’ao, raty tanañe
2.  The botanical identity of raketa gasy has been the subject of much confusion. A review of the
literature (60 references) shows that the species has been known by at least eight different names
(and more when naming at sub-varietal level is taken into account). Since 1947 there has been a
marked movement (but with notable exceptions e.g., Vérin, 1997 : 226 n.1 ; Kaufmann, 2000 : 143
n. 5) towards the view that the proper determination is Opuntia monacantha Haw. However, the
grounds  for  such  determination  are  seldom  published  or  else  when  examined  show
inconsistencies which I propose to detail elsewhere.
3. Raketa  vazaha  was commonly described in  the early  literature  as  Opuntia  inermis  or Cactus
inermis  (see  e.g.,  Decary,  1921:  71)  but  is  probably  a  variety  of  Opuntia  ficus-indica  (L.)  Mill., 
cultivars of which enjoy great popularity in Mediterranean-rim countries and beyond. However
it is not entirely certain to my mind that the raketa vazaha that eventually became popular after
the 1950s was the same variety as  the raketa  vazaha that  was introduced in the early  1900s.
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Synonymy would help to account for the striking turnabout in local attitudes to this plant but
pose further questions for taxonomy.
4. Raketa sonjo is almost certainly a (spiny variety) cultivar of Opuntia ficus-indica, though again
the  literature is  far  from showing  the  unanimity  one  might  hope.  Succulent  and  xerophyte
expert  Werner  Rauh  (1995 :  55),  for  instance,  seems  to  view  it  as  Opuntia  monacantha  i.e.,  a
reoccurence of ―Malagasy Cactus‖, which it is not.
5.  The taxonomy of raketa mena is definitely confused and requires further investigation. In 2002
two reports had recently identified the plant as Opuntia stricta (ANGAP et al,  n.d [2001] :1) or
Opuntia stricta Haworth (Randriamampianina et al, 2002). Yet on making further enquiry, I found
that individual researchers at the three collaborating organisations (WWF, ANGAP, and FOFIFA)
were  applying  this  determination to  what  were  clearly  morphologically  distinct  plants.  This
confusion was partly explicable in that there were at least two kinds of invasive raketa mena with
(in 2002) distinct geographies (Middleton n.d. [2003] discusses this confusion and its implications
for invasive species reporting and biological control programmes). In general, while I recognize
that it would be useful for readers to have the scientific names for the varieties of prickly pear
discussed in this article, I am reluctant to make definitive pronouncements given the current
confusion in a literature too often dependent on citation chains. The more I have looked into
Opuntia taxonomy with Karembola informants, the more complex I have found the matter to be.
6.  In many ways, stories told about Malagasy Cactus are the lynchpin of the article. Memory of
this lost cactus has helped to define people‘s experiences with newer raketa varieties and has in
turn been shaped by them. Thus, the meaning attributed to any of the four species only makes
fully sense if we examine their historical trajectories in tandem. Each defines the others in the
context of value systems that address not only economic constraints and opportunities but also
notions of self-worth and personhood in a changing world.
7.  Despite a distinct history as an interstitial region since at least the seventeeth century (see
e.g., Flacourt, 1995 [1661]: 114, 137, 168), Karembola territory and Karembola ethnicity are often
subsumed under the better-known terms ‘’Androy’’ and ‘’[An]tandroy’’.
8.  Although the communities reported in this paper share a broadly similar habitat of
recognizable  biodiversity  (typically  succulents  and  xerophytes),  sub-regional  species
composition  varies  partly  as  a  function  of  topography  and  soil  profile  (see  Battistini,  1964;
Rabesandratana, 1984; Rauh, 1995, 1998).
9.  Although the construction of  large capacity  pluvium, together with the pipeline that  the
Japanese installed from the Menarandra, have improved water supplies for domestic household
use in many parts of Karembola, alternative sources are still required to water stock.
10.  Malimana, Anjedava, 1991
11.  The pro-Malagasy Cactus tradition from the 1920s through to the 1960s had consistently
portrayed  this  variety  as  a  symbol  of  colonial  betrayal.  It  saw  the  promise  made  by
proeradication campaigners that raketa vazaha would replace and be a great improvement on
Malagasy  Cactus  as  nothing  more  than  a  sop  to  public  sensitivities  put  about  by  a  deeply
duplicitous colonial regime. Little of this narrative remained in the early 1980s.
12.  The spread of raketa sonjo had facilitated an extension of raketambazaha by enabling farmers
to protect the plantings with a spiny hedge.
13.  Moral evaluations of new raketa varieties were significantly more complex and ambivalent
than those reported from the Androka region (Mahafale) c.1995 by Kaufmann (2000). Kaufmann
stresses the sense of continuity in local perceptions of raketa production and consumption. Such
story-telling,  which  downplays  cultural  métissage  and  stresses  the  unbrokenness  of  history,
would appear to be in keeping with other reported local opinion from Androka, viz., that the
demise of Malagasy Cactus had minimal impact. Karembola discourse on new varieties of prickly
pear was more complex on two counts. First, because it constantly juggled the idea of partial
restoration  as  represented  by  the  adoption  of  new  varieties  with  the  master  narrative  that
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represents  the death of  Malagasy Cactus  as  an earthshattering break,  and secondly,  because
moral evaluations of these species were complicated by contrasts between ritual and subsistence
domains,  contrasts  which  were  in  turn  associated  with  distinctions  between  the  poor/low
ancestry and rich/high rank.
14.  The kokolampo,  localised ―nature spirits‖  that also accompanied the ancestors from time
immemorial, were regularly said to prefer and practice the ―cleanliness‖ of vazaha and vazaha
fomba to filthy gasy. Such reflections formed part of a broader discourse on the appropriateness
of hybrid forms of behaviour that was current in these years (Middleton, 2002).
15. Raketa dependency was held to be manifest proof of the hakeo (moral blame) the disinherited
carry  from  the  past;  such  persons  were  either  excluded  from  ritual  celebrating  ancestral
transcendence on account of their poverty or else were symbolically ‘’marked’’ as inferior in the
rituals concerned. Bodily conditions such as thirst and hunger were key metaphors for base rank.
16.  I  initially  assumed that  these  non-ancestral  varieties  of  prickly  pear  were  seen  as
incompatible with the sacred domain of ancestral authority - until elderly informants told me
that the same exclusions had applied to Malagasy Cactus too. It was common practice to plant
thorny Saonjo around abandoned prayer-posts (fallen hazomanga) and ghost-houses (tranon-dolo),
‘’taboo land you fear to tread’’, and in such contexts cactus stands do become masiñe (sacred,
efficacious, vested with taboo power) through proximity to and association with powerful things.
But these are sites symbolic of historical decline rather than of ongoing reproduction.
17.  While this is not the place to rehearse the archival evidence, it is clear that the death of
Malagasy Cactus affected local people unevenly, depending partly on resource access,  itself  a
function of locality, rank, gender, and age.
18.  Because of the national political and economic crisis, the region was not declared a disaster
zone until July 1992.
19.  The contribution of raketa sonjo to the local economy probably had not grown significantly
over the intervening decade, but interpretations and explanations of its use value had changed
significantly.
20.  There are striking congruities between the narratives I collected in the early 1990s and the
so-called ―received wisdoms‖ that dominated western development discourse around that time
viz.,  that  African  smallholders  were  recklessly  destroying  their  natural  resources  by
inappropriate land use (Cloudsley-Thompson, 1984; Mainguet, 1994; UNEP, 1992, 1993; Dregne et
al, 1991). This is not however the place to review the evidence on regional trends in drought
incidence and forest cover, let alone attempt a model of food insecurity that weighs ecological
against socio-economic factors.
21. Raketa saonjo was the preferred species for this purpose, being easy to propagate, exempt
from taboos on sowing/planting fruit trees; and accepted as proof of cultivation (possession) by
the state.
22.  Significantly, my companion referred to them as ondevo rather than, say, as the descendants
of former slaves. Although manumission had been proclaimed in Madagascar in 1896, ideas about
slaves and dependants still constituted key terms in Karembola political discourse.
23.  No one mentioned the possibility that these ‘’slaves’’ might then try to shed their moral
blame by turning their newly acquired livestock into status through socially approved channels
of competitive expenditure, but this may have been a fear.
24.  This raketa mena was not the raketa mena of Anjedava 1991, which is known in the Cap Sainte
Marie region as raketa mandrerake or raketa befatike (see Middleton, n.d. [2003]).
25.  ANGAP (―Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Aires Protégées‖/National Association
for the Management of Protected Areas) is a parastatal agency charged with managing natural
parks and reserves in Madagascar while FOFIFA (‘’Foibe Fikarohana momba ny Fambolena’’) is a
Malagasy government department concerned with agronomic research.
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26.  In fact, informants were expressing affection for the collectivism sponsored by Tsiranana
and before that  by the French colonial  state.  For all  its  emphasis  on coopérativisation  agricole
(Ratsiraka,  1975 :  64-66,  74),  the  Ratsiraka  government  more  or  less  abandoned  collective
plantations in Karembola.
27.  Interviews with fellow taxi-brousse travellers and with residents of towns en route from
Tôlañaro to  Tsihombe,  1/12/2002.  This  confusion has  crept  into  scientific  literature,  notably
Rauh (1995: 55).
28.  For  a  contemporary but  somewhat different  East  Coast  Malagasy discourse on vazaha as
source of wealth, especially consumer goods, see Cole, 2003. Cole reports that the young people
she interviewed in Tamatave thought that their inability to realise their desires for all that is
European produced bastard, degenerate social forms – ―cultural mixing‖ (métissage). For them,
vita gasy (―made in Madagascar‖) was synonymous with ―second rate‖. My informants aspired
(for the most part unsuccessfully) to be producers and consumers of raketa vazaha [European
cactus] but the hybrid or métis saonjo (‘’made in Madagascar’’) was considered far from ―second
rate‖.
29.  In contrast  to the Toliara region where prickly pear fruits  are traded across substantial
distances in commercial networks, the Karembola trade had been up to then on a petty scale – a
basket here, a bowl there, a small pile on the ground.
30. Raketambazaha producing households enjoyed a certain local renown, in the fruiting season
attracting clients from a considerable radius. Travelling as far as Ampanihy and Marolinta to
market their produce, they in turn had a range wider than most villagers.
31. Raketambazaha commodification was not for instance symbolised as household-based activity
that threatened traditional processes of ancestral reproduction; there was no need to ‘’wash’’ the
cash gained through these transactions in order to make it acceptable in sacred contexts (cf.
Parry and Bloch, 1989). In the 1980s, money, unlike prickly pears, was widely acceptable in ritual
contexts, provided it was used in ways that reinforced the status of existing élites.
32.  Although the very poor can make one-off gains by selling raketa during drought periods,
they  generally  fail  (for  various  reasons)  to  break  through  the  critical  barrier  of  capital
accumulation that is needed for sustained status advancement. Without enough livestock in the
‘’bank’’ to cover aggressive ritual expenditure and the everyday risks that deplete herds, they
slip back into a position where they have to sell the stock, and even their raketa, in order to raise
the money to buy in basic foods.
33.  The authors of the reports on raketa mena had overlooked its critical role in food security
precisely because they consulted primarily with rural élites.
34. Raketa  sonjo,  and  even  raketa  mena,  can  become  objects  of  commoditization  under  food
scarcity. The difference is that raketa vazaha is commoditized even in good years - because it is a
‘’specialized’’ or ‘’luxury good’’ rather than ‘’primary’’ or ‘’bulk’’ commodity. Supply is limited by
productive difficulties, and consumption by bodily constraints.
35.  Elements of popular discourse seemed to underscore the fragility of this market-based vision
of the future. For example, raketambazaha was greedy for good land, ideally empty stock-pens of
which  there  were  sadly  now  plenty  available  because  livestock  numbers  had  declined
dramatically.
36.  According to the first count of the vote [December 2002], Ravalomanana‘s candidate did not
win  in  this  constituency;  within  a  few days,  this  verdict  had  been  overturned,  allegedly  on
instruction  from  Antananarivo.  Ravalomanana  remained  in  power  until  early  2009  when
increasing  disillusionment  with  his  free  market  policies  (exemplified  above  all  in  the  well-
published  Daewoo  land  grab)  led  to  protests  that,  skilfully  exploited  by  the  mayor  of
Antananarivo, led to his (current) departure. In this paper I have been concerned to report on
data collected to 2003, and have avoided analyses that would second-guess the future in the light
of more recent political events in Madagascar.
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37.  For example, Decary‘s elaborations upon the local proverb of ‘’kinship’’ between Tandroy
and raketa [gasy] (Decary, 1930: 127), and, more recently, Kaufmann‘s (2000) concept of ‘’cactus
pastoralism’’.
38.  Gender is an important aspect of this question but is too complex to discuss here. Generally,
although most routine cactus-related tasks are gendered, Karembola men and women share rank
interests because production and exchange are household based.
39.  Community leaders (Presiday, Komity) are drawn from among the general category of ondatibe
, middle-aged male family or lineage heads. However, while all male elders and/or lineage heads
are ondatibe in theory, the public arena, including and perhaps especially occasions that involve
interactions with vazaha, is dominated by wealthy men from élite lineages who gain prominence
and influence through ceremonial and marriage networks. The office of mpisoro (clan or lineage
priest, often held by an elderly, sometimes bedridden, man) is more ritual than political, with
spiritual rather than temporal power - unless the holder is still young enough to combine the
function with active  political  agency and presence  in  community  affairs  as  orator,  marriage
broker, and feast-sponsor/participant.
ABSTRACTS
Prickly pears from the New World have had a long and chequered history in the drylands of
southern Madagascar since the late eighteenth century when the first variety was introduced.
Yet  for  much of  this  period relatively poor data sets  make it  difficult  to recover indigenous
perceptions of  these plants.  This paper explores local attitudes to prickly pears over a more
modest timespan by drawing on ethnographic data recorded in the Karembola region at intervals
over a twenty year period (1981-2003). Focusing on changing evaluations of four named varieties,
the paper  shows how local  attitudes  to  prickly  pear  varieties  cannot  be  understood without
understanding  the  political  and  symbolic  ideologies  of  social  reproduction  and  exchange  in
which they are embedded. Relating key narrative shifts to broader debates around social value
and  personhood,  use-value  and  commodification,  foreigners  and  biodiversity,  the  article
highlights a Ravalomanana-type discourse on the self as emergent capitalist, a self-identification
which  was  difficult  to  square  with  the  reality  of  life  as  experienced  by  most  Karembola  in
2002-2003.
Plusieurs espèces de cactus (Opuntia), originaires du Nouveau Monde, ont été introduites dans
l’extrême sud de Madagascar à travers les siècles depuis la première introduction faite en 1769.
Pourtant,  les attitudes indigènes malgaches envers ces plantes exotiques pendant toute cette
durée  sont  curieusement  ignorées,  à  cause  de  données  disponibles  très  limitées.  Cet  article
propose d’étudier l’évolution des représentations locales sur un espace de temps plus modeste à
partir d’un recueil de données ethnographiques rassemblées en pays Karembola par intervalles
entre 1981 et 2003. Mettant à jour les transformations subies au cours de cette vingtaine d’années
par les évaluations indigènes de quatre variétés bien précisées, l’article démontre comment les
idées  émises  par  les  Karembola  sur  leurs  cactus,  loin  d’être  réductibles  aux  considérations
exclusivement pragmatiques, ne se font comprendre qu’avec recours aux idéologies politiques et
symboliques dans lesquelles elles se sont enchâssées. Rattachant les modifications essentielles
des narrations aux débats plus larges concernant la valeur sociale, y compris le pouvoir et la
hiérarchie, la reproduction et l’échange, la production d’usage et la marchandisation, ainsi que la
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revalorisation de la biodiversité et la signification des étrangers, l’analyse met en évidence un
discours local émergent sur la personne imaginée comme capitaliste. Cette identification de soi-
même, quoique rappelant fortement le discours populaire national qui a poussé vers le pouvoir
Ravalomanana en 2002, était difficile à concilier avec les réalités de l’existence comme elle était
vécue par la plupart des Karembola en 2002-2003.
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